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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over 
interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a first degree or capital felony. Utah 
Code §78-2a-3 (2) (e) . Mr. Robertson's petition for interlocutory 
review was granted by this Court on December 22, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue before the court is whether §10-3-928 of the Utah 
Code, which expressly allows city attorneys to prosecute state 
infractions and misdemeanors in the name of the State of Utah 
violates Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution? 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss based upon its 
conclusion that the challenged statute is constitutionally valid 
1 
presents a question of law. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals 
reviews that decision under a correction-of-error standard, 
granting no particular deference to the trial court. West Valley 
City v. Streeter, 208 Utah Adv. Rep 92, (Utah App. 1993) . 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Article VIII, Section 16, of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The Legislature shall provide for a system of public 
prosecutors who shall have primary responsibility for 
the prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name 
of the State of Utah and shall perform such other 
duties as may be provided by statute. Public 
prosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided by 
statute, and shall be admitted to practice law in Utah. 
The original action against Mr. Robertson was brought 
pursuant to the authority provided to the prosecutor under Utah 
Code §10-3-928 which states: 
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney may 
prosecute violations of city ordinances, and under 
state law, infractions and misdemeanors occurring 
within the boundaries of the municipality and has the 
same powers in respect to the violations as are 
exercised by a county attorney, including, but not 
limited to, granting immunity to witnesses. The city 
attorney shall represent the interests of the state or 
the municipality in the appeal of any matter prosecuted 
in any trial court by the city attorney. 
The Legislature added a technical amendment to §10-3-928 in 
1993 to include district attorneys, however, the operative 
language allowing city attorneys the authority to prosecute state 
infractions and misdemeanors has remained the same. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Defendant, Bruce S. Robertson, petitioned for interlocutory 
appeal from the ruling of the Third Circuit Court, State of Utah, 
2 
denying Robertson's motion to dismiss an Information filed 
against him based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of Utah 
Code §10-3-928. In denying Robertson's motion to dismiss the 
trial court upheld the constitutionality of Utah Code §10-3-928, 
which grants authority to cities with city attorney's to 
prosecute state infractions and misdemeanors. 
II. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
West Jordan City brought four charges against Bruce S. 
Robertson in the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department, 
which are: (1) Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44; (2) Driving on Revocation 
in violation of Section 41-2-136.3; (3) Reckless Driving in 
violation of Section 41-6-45; and (4) Fleeing from a Police 
Officer in violation of Section 41-6-13.5. 
Robertson was arraigned and Susan Denhardt, Legal Defenders 
Association, was appointed to represent him. Robertson filed a 
motion to dismiss claiming that the city attorney did not have 
the authority to prosecute state code charges. The trial court 
denied Robertson's motion to dismiss finding that the defense had 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Utah Code §10-3-
928 is unconstitutional and holding that §10-3-928 does fit 
within the framework of the Utah Constitution. This Court 
granted Robertson's petition for interlocutory review upon the 
trial court's denial of Robertson's motion to dismiss. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution directs 
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the Utah Legislature to establish a system of public prosecutors 
who have primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal 
actions bought in the name of the State of Utah. By the use of 
the word primary the constitutional language mandates that there 
are other prosecutors who also have responsibility to prosecute 
actions in the name of the State of Utah. City attorneys have 
been fulfilling this role for almost twenty years. By enacting 
Utah Code §10-3-928 the Legislature slightly expanded the role of 
city attorneys in the prosecution arena and established public 
policy by further defining the prosecution system as the 
Legislature is directed to do pursuant to the constitutional 
language. 
ARGUMENT 
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
A basic principle of constitutional adjudication is that the 
courts should presume statutes to be constitutionally valid. 
Utah Associated Municipal Power System v. Public Service 
Commission, 789 P.2d 298 (Utah 1990). Also, it is a fundamental 
principle of judicial review that where possible, the court 
refrain from deciding constitutional questions, unless required 
to do so. State by and through Division of Consumer Protection 
v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd, 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990). 
The party attacking the constitutionality of the statute has 
the burden of proof in establishing the statutes 
unconstitutionality. Utah Associated Municipal Power System v. 
Public Service Commission, 789 P.2d 298 (Utah 1990). Utah courts 
4 
have made it abundantly clear that the reviewing court, when 
faced with a "constitutional" question, has "a duty" to construe 
the statute to avoid constitutional infirmities whenever 
possible. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. 
Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991). A statute will not be 
held to be unconstitutional if any reasonable basis can be found 
to bring it within constitutional framework. State v. Davis, 787 
P.2d 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). If there are two alternative 
statutory constructions available one rendering the statute 
constitutional and the other unconstitutional the former 
construction should be adopted. Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989). The court 
will not invalidate the statute unless it is "clearly in 
conflict" with the Constitution. State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220 
(Utah 1983) . The court is to afford the challenged statute every 
presumption of validity, so long as there is a reasonable basis 
upon which both provisions of the statute and the mandate of the 
Constitution may be reconciled. Timpanogos Planning and Water 
Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690 
P.2d 562 (Utah 1984). 
Past court decisions have framed the standard of proof 
required before a statute may be declared to be unconstitutional 
as "clearly and palpably" unconstitutional. See Ellis v. 
Department of Social Services of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). Recently the Utah 
Court of Appeals has declared that a statute will not be struck 
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down unless it appears to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 
clarifying and restating the burden to be met by one who 
challenges a statute on constitutional grounds the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that "The act is presumed valid, and we resolve any 
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality". Society of 
Separationists v. Whitehead 227 Utah Adv. Rep 67 (Utah App. 1993) 
When applied against the foregoing jurisprudential principles, 
defendant's arguments fail. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INFORMAL OPINION 92-16 
Robertson, relying almost exclusively on Informal Opinion 
#92-16, dated 4 December 1992, issued by the Attorney General's 
Office, has moved to have the charges filed against him 
dismissed. A signed copy of Informal Opinion #92-16 is contained 
in Addendum A. Informal Opinion 92-16 concluded that Utah Code 
§10-3-928, was unconstitutional. In reaching the conclusion that 
Utah Code §10-3-928 is unconstitutional the Attorney General's 
Opinion does not even refer to a single Utah appellate court 
decision concerning the "constitutionality" of an act. Rather, 
the opinion concludes that all prosecutions in the name of the 
State of Utah must either be by an elected prosecutor or by a 
prosecutor under the direction and supervision of an elected 
prosecutor. 
The Attorney General's Opinion ignores the constitutional 
language of Article VIII, Section 16 that mandates to the 
Legislature to establish a system of public prosecutors who have 
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primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal actions 
brought in the name of the State of Utah. The opinion focuses 
entirely upon court decisions from other jurisdictions without 
recognizing or acknowledging that city attorneys have had 
statutory authority to prosecute in the name of the State of Utah 
for nearly twenty years. Such selective, result-oriented 
jurisprudence is inappropriate in this setting, particularly when 
the constitutionality of a statute is at issue. 
This case is distinguishable from the cases cited in the 
Informal Opinion and Robertson's brief. Defendant cited Murphy 
v. Yates, 348 A.2d 837, 841 (Md. Ct. App. 1975), a Maryland case, 
which decided whether a prosecutor created by state law could 
prosecute when those same duties were given to the State's 
Attorneys. However, the Maryland Constitution was worded 
differently, and the history of the Attorney General and State's 
Attorneys were much different than that of Utah's prosecutors. 
The Maryland State's Attorneys derived their powers through 
constitutional revision from those granted earlier to the 
Attorney General: "It shall be the duty of the attorney general 
to prosecute and defend . . ., all cases now depending, . . . ." 
Murphy v. Yates, 348 A.2d 837, 841 (Md. Ct. App. 1975) (declaring 
a legislative act unconstitutional which created an independent 
state prosecutor's office having some of the same duties as the 
State's Attorney). 
However, Judge Levine, in dissent, focused on the 
constitutional language granting the State's Attorney power ("as 
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shall be provided by law") and said that the majority was wrong 
because an overwhelming number of jurisdictions having such 
language permitted the legislature to fully prescribe such duties 
including diminishing them. Further, that the act was not 
unconstitutional because it did not cause the office of State's 
Attorney to be left without its "substantial duties, 
responsibilities and rights." 
Additionally, Robertson, and the Attorney General's Opinion 
cited a Rhode Island case which considered whether proposed 
legislation would create a conflict with the constitutional 
powers of the Attorney General. The court held that providing a 
special prosecutor with "full prosecutorial authority" would be a 
transfer of the Attorney General's "fundamental powers." 
However, that court based its decision largely on the following: 
"It is well settled in this state that the Attorney General is 
the only state official vested with prosecutorial discretion." 
In re House of Representatives, 575 A.2d 176, 179 (R.I. 1990) 
(holding that proposed legislation violated a constitutional 
provision concerning the Attorney General's duties and powers). 
Lastly, Robertson, and the Attorney General's Opinion cited 
a North Dakota case which considered whether the enforcement of 
liquor laws could be performed by an appointed office. That 
court said that to interpret the constitution it must be 
considered in the "light of contemporaneous history - of 
conditions existing at and prior to its adoption." Ex parte 
Corliss, 114 N.W. 962, 967 (N.D. 1907). The ultimate decision of 
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the North Dakota court was that an office created by the 
constitution could not be eroded in its power by an appointed 
office. However, the court made it clear that the history and 
the intent of the framers were important considerations. "In 
other words, the spirit as well as the letter of the instrument, 
must be given effect." Id. at 967. 
Concerning the application of constitutional cases from 
other states, Justice Oaks of the Utah Supreme Court has 
observed: 
It makes clear that the question posed here turns on a 
construction of disparate provision of the 
constitutions and statutes of the various states. In 
this area, judicial opinions from other states have 
limited value as precedents, except insofar as they 
identify the public policy consideration that 
illuminate constitutional and statutory construction. 
Wilson v Manning, 657 P.2d 251 at 252 (Utah 1982). 
Unlike the cases cited by Robertson, Utah's Legislature is 
directed to provide for a system of public prosecutors who have 
primary responsibility for the criminal actions brought in the 
name of the state of Utah. When the new language of the Utah 
Constitution was adopted the Legislature was fully aware that 
city attorneys have historically had prosecutorial authority 
which they shared with elected prosecutors. Utah's Constitution 
does not grant exclusive authority to elected prosecutors, nor 
deprive the Legislature of their power to establish the state's 
prosecutorial system. 
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 16 CONTEMPLATES 
ELECTED AND NON-ELECTED PROSECUTORS 
The defendant, in arguing that the clear language of Utah 
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Code §10-3-928 is unconstitutional, focuses merely upon the word 
"elected" in Article VIII, Section 16, of the Utah Constitution 
and refuses to consider the language of the entire section. The 
defendant argues that having an elected prosecutor maintains the 
integrity of the prosecutorial role and implies that an appointed 
prosecutor may be susceptible to outside pressures. The court 
should note that in the federal district attorney's office, the 
largest single prosecutorial system, federal district attorney's 
are appointed, not elected. Contrary to the underlying theme of 
defendant's argument, public policy does not dictate that all 
prosecutors be elected. 
Article VIII, Section 16, of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The Legislature shall provide for a system of public 
prosecutors who shall have primary responsibility for 
the prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name 
of the State of Utah and shall perform such other 
duties as may be provided by statute. Public 
prosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided by 
statute, and shall be admitted to practice law in 
Utah. 
The language of Article VIII, Section 16, states that public 
prosecutors shall have the primary responsibility for the 
prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name of the State 
of Utah. Without considering the distinction between what is the 
primary responsibility and what would be the secondary 
responsibility, or nonprimary responsibility, defendant relies 
upon the Attorney General's Informal Opinion and asserts that a 
problem arises because city attorneys are not under the 
supervision or control of elected public prosecutors. Defendant 
ignores the clear language of Article VIII, Section 16 and argues 
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that all prosecutions must be under the direction of an elected 
prosecutor. Defendant fails to address the idea that the 
Legislature provided for a system of prosecution that did not 
require all prosecutors to be under the control or supervision of 
the Attorney General, or an elected county or district attorney. 
Title 77, Chapter 10(a) of the Utah Code, Grand Jury Reform, 
allows for a district court judge serving as the supervising 
judge on the five-judge grand jury panel to appointment a special 
prosecutor if the supervising judge follows certain criteria. 
The special prosecutor is neither elected, nor supervised by 
elected prosecutors. Plaintiff recognizes there is a distinction 
between a special prosecutor and a city attorney. However, the 
illustration points out that the absolute strict construction 
defendant argues for in having all prosecutors elected or 
supervised by an elected prosecutor would make several provisions 
of the Utah Code unconstitutional. 
In deciding whether Utah Code §10-3-928 is unconstitutional 
the court must determine who functions in the role of a public 
prosecutor. Then, secondly, if the public prosecutor does not 
have complete responsibility, then what other prosecutors, if not 
public prosecutors, have responsibility to prosecute criminal 
actions brought in the name of the State of Utah? 
Article VIII, Section 16, begins with the phrase stating 
that "the legislature shall provide for a system of public 
prosecutors who shall have the primary responsibility for the 
prosecution of criminal actions . . . ." First, "the legislature 
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shall provide . . . ." clearly indicates that the framers did not 
intend for the Constitution to mandate this system, but rather 
that the Legislature should create this system by statute. 
Second, that these prosecutors shall have "primary 
responsibility" indicates that the framers envisioned a secondary 
prosecuting responsibility. 
The Legislature has "provided for" the "system" by 
designating that county attorneys or district attorneys of the 
various counties or districts, respectively, to be the public 
prosecutorial agency with the primary responsibility to prosecute 
state cases. However, that designation is not absolute in 
nature. The legislatively adopted system provides for the 
"sharing" of this prosecutorial responsibility. Indeed, §17-18-
1(1)(a), Utah Code, provides: 
(1) In each county which is not within a 
prosecution district, the county attorney is 
a public prosecutor and shall: 
(a) conduct on behalf of the state 
all prosecutions for public 
offenses committed within the 
county, except for prosecutions 
undertaken by the city attorney 
under Section 10-3-928 and appeals 
from them; . . . . 
(2) The county attorney: 
(a) shall appear and prosecute for 
the state in the district court of 
the county in all criminal 
prosecutions; . . . 
Also, §17-18-1.7(1) (a) and (2) (a) Utah Code, follows the 
same language in describing the powers and duties of the district 
attorneys. 
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(1) The district attorney is a public 
prosecutor and shall: 
(a) prosecute in the name of the 
state all violations of criminal 
statutes of the state;. . 
(c) conduct on behalf of the state 
all prosecutions for public 
offenses committed within the 
county, except for prosecutions 
undertaken by the city attorney 
under Section 10-3-928 and appeals 
from them; . . . . 
(2) The district attorney shall: 
(a) appear and prosecute for the 
state in the district court all 
criminal actions for violation of 
state law;. . . 
If the position of Robertson, and the Attorney General's 
Opinion, is to be followed, portions of these statutes would be 
unconstitutional. Other potentially "unconstitutional" statutes 
are §76-10-1215 (adopted in 1977, authorizing city attorneys to 
prosecute state law obscenity violations, including felonies), 
§41-6-44.8 (originally adopted in 1983, authorizing city 
attorneys to prosecute traffic code violations, including 
enhanced DUI, driving on revocation and/or suspension, and 
automobile homicide) and §76-10-1308 (authorizing city attorneys 
to prosecute prostitution violations). If the court accepts the 
interpretation the defendant argues for several separate statutes 
could be "unconstitutional." 
In lieu of such a drastic result, could there not be another 
interpretation of Article VIII, Section 16 which would give 
validity to all of the statutes of which two actually preceded 
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the adoption, in 1984, of the constitutional amendment? We submit 
that such an interpretation is found within the text of Article 
VIII, Section 16 itself. The Section specifies that "(t)he 
Legislature shall provide for a system of public prosecutors . . 
. ." Indeed, the Legislature has complied with that obligation: 
It has established a "system", wherein the county and district 
attorneys have "primary responsibility11 for conducting the 
criminal prosecutions. However, if the county attorney or 
district attorney has "primary responsibility" to conduct the 
criminal prosecutions, could it not be that there must be another 
prosecutor which might have "secondary responsibility" for those 
prosecutions? That prosecutor is the city attorney. 
Defendant argues that primary responsibility means chief or 
principal control or authority over the prosecution. However, 
defendant again circumvents the word primary. Who did the 
Legislature have in mind when they used the word primary rather 
than sole or exclusive responsibility? The Legislature intended 
to give non-primary responsibility to certain prosecutors to 
prosecute actions in the name of the State of Utah. City 
attorneys are the prosecutors the Legislature intended to fulfill 
that secondary role. 
The "system" devised by the Legislature is similar, in 
certain aspects, to "federalism:" The prosecutorial power is 
divided between two prosecutorial agencies. This approach is 
consistent with the "primary responsibility" language and allows 
for an interpretation which gives meaning to the term "primary". 
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Robertson's interpretation of that phrase substitutes a new word 
(i.e. "sole" or "exclusive" responsibility) in the phrase. Such 
an interpretation does violence to the whole purpose of the 1984 
constitutional amendment. That amendment was not intended to 
render "unconstitutional" those statutes such as §41-6-44.8 
(adopted 1983) and §76-10-1215 (adopted 1977) which were 
already in effect and which then allowed municipal attorneys to 
handle state prosecutions. 
Similarly, the 1984 constitutional amendment is not offended 
by §10-3-928, §17-18-1(a) (1) or §17-18-1.7 (1) (a) . Therefore, 
Utah Code Ann. §10-3-928 does not violate Article VIII, Section 
16 of the Utah Constitution. 
Robertson has failed in his burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the statute, presumed to be constitutional, 
is "unconstitutional." Robertson focuses merely upon the word 
"elected" as though it were the most important word, to dominate 
the entire provision. With regard to the "elected" issue, 
Robertson's argument is merely a smokescreen, not focusing upon 
the correct issue. 
The 1984 constitutional amendment was proposed to the 
electorate with the endorsement of the Legislature and various 
prosecuting agencies, including but not limited to the Utah 
Association of Counties, the Statewide Association of Prosecutors 
(SWAP) and the Attorney General. The requirement that there be an 
"elected" prosecutor was very important, for the following 
reason: The "primary" prosecutor had to be elected in order to 
15 
insure that there was an independent prosecutor who could 
zealously undertake that prosecution without fear of being fired 
if he prosecuted the wrong person, such as another government 
official, whether elected or appointed. 
The provision requiring that public prosecutors be elected 
does not require that ALL prosecutors be elected. The 
Legislature has "provided" the "system" of "public prosecutors," 
in which the "elected" county or district attorney and/or the 
appointed city attorney, under the provisions of §10-3-928, could 
prosecute state statute violations. If at any time a city 
attorney fails to prosecute an individual for an alleged 
violation then the appropriate county or district attorney can 
prosecute the alleged violations. However, city attorneys can 
not prosecute all violations of state law, only misdemeanors and 
infractions. This distinction delineates between public 
prosecutors with primary responsibility and city attorneys who 
have a secondary responsibility and are only allowed to prosecute 
infractions and misdemeanors. 
If the public feels a city attorney is failing to prosecute 
certain violations of the law then the public can request that 
the county or district attorney prosecute the violations. This 
is the safe guard the public has against city attorneys not 
fulfilling their prosecutorial responsibilities. However, if a 
county or district attorney fails or refuses to prosecute certain 
violations then the public must elect a different county or 
district attorney. 
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Defendants arguments and those arguments put forth by the 
Attorney General's Opinion 92-16 are not concerned that the city 
attorneys will fail to prosecute violations of the law. Rather, 
the arguments seem to focus on the fact that city attorneys will 
not be supervised by the Attorney General or county attorney. 
Perhaps this is exactly what the Legislature intended when they 
amended §10-3-928 giving municipal attorneys autonomy from state 
and county government. 
The Legislature saw the need to authorize municipal 
attorneys to prosecute state misdemeanors and infractions. The 
specific purpose of the Legislature's intent behind the 1991 
amendment of §10-3-928 is found in the title to House Bill 436 
[Trial Court Organization and Jurisdiction]: "An Act . . . 
increasing authority of city prosecutors. . ." Emphasis added. 
Therefore, we request this court to uphold the trial court's 
denial of Robertson's motion to dismiss and find that Utah Code 
§10-3-928 is constitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Robertson's argument requires that this court accept his 
interpretation of the wording of Article VIII, Section 16; 
however, the weight of evidence is clearly in favor of the State. 
Historically, the communities of Utah have been represented by 
both appointed and elected prosecutors. It has been the 
Legislatures intent in passing several statutes, including §10-3-
928, allowing city attorneys to prosecute actions in the name of 
the state, to have both appointed as well as elected prosecutors 
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to be part of Utah's system of prosecutors. 
Robertson has not met his burden of establishing, by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statutes, specifically §10-3-
928, authorizing the municipal attorney-directed prosecution of 
the alleged state statute violations are unconstitutional. On 
the contrary, there is at least one other reasonable 
interpretation to Article VIII, Section 16 which gives meaning 
and significance to the entire provision. This Court should rule 
that Robertson has not met his burden of persuasion. The Court 
should follow its principles of constitutional adjudication 
regarding the presumption of validity and declare that §10-3-928, 
is constitutional and that the instant prosecution may proceed. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of July, 1994. 
WES/ri/ JDRD, CtTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
GRECy Jjf CURTIS 
Assj/sttfant West J o r d a n C i t y A t t o r n e y 
At t |>r$ey f o r P l a i n t i f f 
S t a t e of Utah 
8000 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84 088 
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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
STATE OF UTAN 
JOHN fc CLARK JAN GRAHAM JOSEPH F TESCH 
Counsel to the Attorney General Solicitor General Chief Deputy Attorney General 
Department of State Counsel Department of Appeals & Opinions Department of Public Advocacy 
December 4, 1992 
Mr. David E. Yocom 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Subject: Informal Opinion No* 92-16 
H,B. 436 - Authority of City Attorneys 
To Prosecute Under State Law 
Dear Mr* Yocom: 
On behalf of the Advisory Board of the Statewide Association 
of Prosecutors, you have asked our opinion concerning the 
constitutionality of a portion of House Bill 436 (1991 General 
Session) which amended Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 and which 
statutorily authorized city attorneys to prosecute violations of 
certain state laws occurring within the boundaries of their 
municipalities. 
Noting that city attorneys are not elected, you asked whether 
this provision, violates Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah 
Constitution which provides that public prosecutors shall be 
elected and shall have primary responsibility for the prosecution 
of criminal actions brought in the name of the State of Utah. You 
indicated that before the passage of H.B, 436, city attorneys had 
been limited in their prosecution duties to prosecuting under city 
ordinances or specific state statutes as provided by the 
legislature, or under authority granted to them by deputization 
from county attorneys. 
Issues and Short Answers 
PRIMARY ISSUE: Is the provision in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 
which authorizes city attorneys to prosecute crimes under state law 
constitutional? 
SHORT ANSWER: No. 
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SECONDARY ISSUE: Are convictions which have been obtained by 
city prosecutors pursuant to section 10-3-928 nevertheless valid? 
SHORT ANSWER: Yes. 
Analysis 
As amended, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 reads: 
Attorney duties -- Deputy public prosecutor 
In cities with a city attorney, the city 
attorney may prosecute violations of city 
ordinances, and under state law, infractions 
and misdemeanors occurring within the 
boundaries of the municipality and has the 
same powers in respect to the violations as 
are exercised by a county attorney, including, 
but not limited to, granting immunity to 
witnesses . . -
Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution provides as 
follows: 
The Legislature shall provide for a system of 
public prosecutors who shall have primary 
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal 
actions brought in the name of the State of 
Utah and shall perform such other duties as 
may be provided by statute- Public 
prosecutors shall be elected in a manner 
provided by statute, and shall be admitted to 
practice law in Utah... [emphasis added.] 
The Constitution thus provides that public prosecutors shall 
have primary responsibility for the prosecution of state criminal 
actions, and that such prosecutors must be elected. The 
legislature has provided for such a system of elected public 
prosecutors by establishing county attorneys, who are elected, and 
by vesting prosecutorial authority in the Attorney General, who is 
also elected.1 
!Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1(5) vests the Attorney General with 
supervisory powers over county attorneys of the state in all 
matters pertaining to the duties of their offices. There is no 
such provision giving the Attorney General supervisory authority 
over city attorneys. 
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Also, a deputy county attorney may act for the county 
attorney, without violating the constitutional provision that 
elected public prosecutors have primary responsibility, as a county 
attorney can always review a deputy's recommendation and substitute 
the county attorney's own decision for that of the deputy. State 
v. Winne, 189 N.W. 119, 120 (S.D. 1922) (wa deputy state's attorney 
does not fill a new office created by statute, and is not endowed 
with functions usurped from those of the constitutional officer.") 
The problem with section 10-3-928 is that it gives broad 
general authority to city attorneys who are appointed rather than 
elected (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-902) to exercise the powers of 
public prosecutors by prosecuting infractions and misdemeanors 
under state law; that is, prosecuting in the name of the State of 
Utah. Thus, under section 10-3-928, a city attorney derives the 
power to prosecute state offenses directly from the statute, rather 
than by being a delegee of, and under the supervision of, a public 
prosecutor. 
Indeed, the statute grants prosecutorial authority to a city 
attorney whether or not the county attorney consents. The city 
attorney could decide to prosecute a person whom the county 
attorney would not have prosecuted, or to grant immunity to one to 
whom the county attorney would not have granted immunity, or to 
prosecute as a misdemeanor a case that the county attorney would 
have prosecuted as a felony. These types of decisions are the 
essence of prosecutorial discretion. &g£ 27 CJ.S. District and 
Prosecuting Attorneys § 14(1). State v. Bell> 785 P.2d 390, 402 
(Utah 1989) (prosecutors are given broad discretion in determining 
whether and in what manner to prosecute a case). Further, since 
county attorneys are elected, the people have the authority to vote 
the public prosecutor out of office should they be dissatisfied 
with the decisions of the prosecutor. 
In Ex Parte Corliss, 114 N.W. 962 (N.D. 1907), a state statute 
created an appointed office of "enforcement commissioner'1 and 
invested the commissioner with all of the common-law and statutory 
powers of elected state's attorneys in the enforcement of state 
liquor laws* The court found the statute unconstitutional, stating 
that it "violates those provisions of our state Constitution by 
which the people reserved the right to have the public functions 
which are attempted to be conferred upon the officers created by 
said act discharged by officers of their own selection." !£. at 
963. The court also stated that "if these constitutional offices 
can be stripped of a portion of the inherent functions thereof, 
they can be stripped of all such functions, and the same can be 
vested in newly created appointive officers, and the will of the 
framers of the Constitution thereby thwarted." !£. at 964. 
Numerous jurisdictions have followed the Corliss court's 
rationale. For instance, in Murphy v, Yates. 348 A.2d 837 (Md. 
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App. 1975) , the court: struck down a statute which created the 
office of state prosecutor as an independent unit in the executive 
branch because it constituted an invasion of the powers and duties 
of the state's attorneys and the Attorney General, in violation of 
the Maryland'Constitution. 
The Maryland court enunciated the principle that "if an office 
is created in the Constitution, and specific powers are granted or 
duties imposed by the Constitution, . • . the position can neither 
be abolished by statute nor reduced to impotence by the transfer of 
duties characteristic of the office to another office created by 
the legislature• [citations omitted] We regard this as but another 
facet of the principle of separation of powers, guaranteed by [the 
Maryland Constitution]. 1^. at 846. 
The court went on to state: 
We do not find persuasive the contention that 
the duties imposed on the Special Prosecutor 
are concurrent with the powers of the State's 
Attorneys. The simple fact is that the 
Special Prosecutor's power to initiate an 
investigation and to commence prosecution is a 
State's Attorney's most awesome discretionary 
power: to determine whether or not to 
prosecute. . . . Praiseworthy through the 
purpose of the General Assembly might have 
been in enacting the legislation, the result 
can only be validly achieved by a 
constitutional amendment, 
I&. at 848. 
Similarly, in the case of ;Tn re House of Representatives. 57S 
A.2d 176 (R.I. 1990), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island determined 
that proposed legislation* which would have created a procedure for 
appointing a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute 
certain crimes, violated that state's constitution by severely 
infringing upon the fundamental constitutional powers of the 
elected Attorney General. !£• at 179-180. 
We find the authorities outlined above to be persuasive and 
well-reasoned. Any person who prosecutes in the name of the State 
of Utah must, according to the Utah Constitution, either be elected 
or be responsible to a public prosecutor who is elected (that is, 
responsible to one who has "primary responsibilityw for the 
prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name of the State of 
Utah)• A city attorney prosecuting state criminal actions by 
virtue of section 10-3-928 is neither an elected prosecutor nor 
responsible to an elected prosecutor* Indeed, each prosecutorial 
decision made by the non-elected city prosecutor diminishes the 
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authority of the elected county attorney to decide otherwise. 
Consequently, section 10-3-928, which purports to create the power 
to prosecute under state law in a person who is neither elected nor 
responsible to an elected prosecutor, violates the Utah 
Constitution: 
While city attorneys cannot derive power to prosecute in the 
name of the State of Utah directly from statute, county attorneys 
are empowered to deputize city attorneys to conduct such 
prosecutions. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-111(2) provides 
that a county attorney "may appoint city prosecutors as deputies to 
prosecute state offenses in municipal justice courts." Therefore, 
if a county attorney deputizes a city attorney, then the city 
attorney derives the power to prosecute state offenses from the 
county attorney, and is subordinate to and responsible to the 
county attorney, an elected prosecutor. 
Effect Upon Prior Convictions 
The foregoing opinion raises the issue of what effect, if any, 
the opinion may have upon prior convictions obtained by city 
attorneys acting pursuant to section 10-3-928. We believe that any 
determination that section 10-3-928 is unconstitutional would not 
void any otherwise valid conviction. 
In State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136 (Utah App. 1991), the 
defendant claimed that the County Attorney who prosecuted him never 
filed a bond as required by statute, and that he was thus without 
authority to initiate the charges, invalidating the trial court's 
jurisdiction to hear the case. The Utah Court of Appeals 
disagreed, upholding defendant's conviction, stating: 
"Under the de facto doctrine the acts of one 
who assumes official authority and exercises 
duties under color of a valid appointment or 
election are valid where the community 
acquiesces to his authority. The mere failure 
to comply with a technical requirement does 
not void the official's actions as to third 
parties and the public. The acts are valid if 
in the interests of justice.n 
Id. at 1139 (citations omitted) • ftCCCtiTfl. State v. Sawyers, 819 
P.2d 806, 808 (Utah App. 1991). 
A city attorney prosecuting pursuant to section 10-3-928 would 
have been acting Mas one who assumes official authority and 
exercises duties under color of a valid appointment where the 
community acquiesces to his authority.* Ibid. Further, in the 
absence of section 10-3-928, the city attorneys could have been 
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deputized by county attorneys to try cases in the name of the State 
of Utah. Hence, the fact of not having been appointed by a county 
prosecutor to try these cases can be viewed as a "mere technical 
requirement which does not void the official's actions as to third 
parties and the public.11 IM£. 
Third, the convictions obtained by the city attorneys are 
clearly "in the interests of justice." We believe that Gambrell is 
controlling in this instance, and that convictions obtained by city 
attorneys while prosecuting in the name of the State of Utah would, 
if otherwise valid, not be invalid due to having been obtained by 
a city attorney. 
Finally, caBe law from many other jurisdictions supports the 
proposition that convictions are valid even though obtained by 
prosecutors who may have had defective appointments. 
In People v. Kemplev, 271 P. 478 (Cal* 1928), the court held 
that special counsel for the state who assumed and exercised duties 
of public officer under authorized appointment was an officer de 
facto though not taking oath of office. 
In People v. Montoya, 616 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1980), the 
defendant contended that his conviction was void because the case 
was prosecuted by deputies of the Attorney General's Office whose 
appointments as special prosecutors for the District Attorney were 
invalid, and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The 
court held, however, that "even if ineligible as special 
prosecutors, the members of the Attorney General's office acted as 
de facto officers whose authority to prosecute [the defendant] may 
not now be challenged*w l&. at 162. (citing Glavino v. People. 224 
P. 225 (Colo. 1924). 
In Stat;e v. Jaramlllo, 749 P.2d 1 (Idaho App. 1987), the 
defendant challenged the validity of the appointment of the deputy 
prosecuting attorney. The court held that under the authority of 
Gasper v. District Court. 264 P.2d 679 (Idaho 1953) [which held, 
inter alia, that where a duty or power is conferred by law on a 
prosecuting attorney in this state, the same duty or power is 
conferred upon his deputies) , the prosecutor was, at the time 
relevant to this case, at least a de facto deputy prosecuting 
attorney. In essence, the court said that if an appointment of the 
deputy prosecuting attorney was not filed, he was at least a de 
facto deputy prosecuting attorney. 
In Gragg v. State. 201 N,W. 338 (Neb. 1924), a county attorney 
appointed a private attorney to undertake a prosecution, but the 
assistant did not file a bond or take the official oath. The court 
affirmed the conviction, stating that the assistant "held himself 
out as county attorney and performed the duties pertaining to this 
office and was recognized by the public as county attorney, so that 
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he was county attorney de facto. M Jjfl- at 340. 
In Pamapet v. 9tate, 182 N,W.2d 459 (Misc. 1971), a district 
attorney elected in one county served two counties. Though his 
acts were arguably illegal as to the second county, the court held 
that he was, at the very least, an officer de facto, and even if 
his acts were illegal as to the second county's electors, such acts 
were still valid* 
Conclusion 
That portion of Utah Code Ann. S 10-3-928 which purports to 
empower city attorneys, who are not elected prosecutors, to 
prosecute state criminal actions, and to do so without being 
responsible to any elected prosecutor concerning such state 
criminal actions, violates the Utah Constitution. 
Notwithstanding the constitutional deficiency of the statute, 
criminal convictions which have been obtained by city prosecutors 
pursuant to section 10-3-928 are nevertheless valid. 
Very truly yourB, 
MICHAEL D. WIMS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Enforcement Division 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Enforcement Division 
